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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No: 02-3917
SIVALINGAM SENTHURAN,
Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General
of the United States
_______
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(INS No. A 78-527-791)

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 19, 2003
Before: McKEE, SMITH, Circuit Judges, and SCHILLER,*
District Judge
(Filed: February 19, 2004)

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Sivalingam Senthuran, a native of Sri Lanka, filed an application on October 23,

* The Honorable Berle M. Schiller, United States District Judge for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

2001 for asylum and for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality
Act (“INA”), claiming that the Sri Lankan army had arrested and tortured him in 1998 by
beating him with plastic pipes filled with sand. He also claimed that he was mistreated in
1997 by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (“LTTE”), a rebel organization in Sri
Lanka. The initial hearing before the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) was continued to afford
Senthuran an opportunity to have the asylum application explained in his native language
of Tamil. Thereafter, Senthuran’s counsel filed several corrections to his application.
During a subsequent hearing, Senthuran acknowledged that his asylum application
had been explained to him in Tamil since the first hearing. In addition, he affirmed that
the application, as amended, was true and correct. His testimony, however, differed
dramatically from his asylum application by, inter alia: (1) claiming that his first contact
with the LTTE was in 1995, as opposed to 1997; (2) omitting any claim of mistreatment
by the LTTE; (3) claiming that his arrest and torture by the Sri Lankan army occurred in
1997, instead of 1998; and (4) affirming that the torture he sustained at the hands of the
Sri Lankan army also included hanging him upside down and dipping his head in a pool
of water.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the IJ rendered an oral opinion denying
Senthuran’s application for asylum and for withholding of removal under the INA, as
well as his request for relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and
Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“Convention
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Against Torture” or “CAT”). The IJ identified numerous inconsistencies between
Senthuran’s application and his testimony and concluded that Senthuran was not credible.
Although Senthuran’s counsel had tried to rehabilitate Senthuran during re-direct, the IJ
pointed out that Senthuran had hurt his case by attempting to blame his counsel for the
discrepancies even though Senthuran had affirmed at the beginning of the hearing that his
asylum application, as amended, was true and correct.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s decision without
opinion pursuant to its streamlining regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(e)(7) (2002). This
timely petition for review followed, asserting that the BIA’s disposition under the
streamlining regulations denied Senthuran the right to meaningful appellate review and
that the IJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.1
Senthuran’s challenge to the streamlining regulations is without merit. We have
recently held that the streamlining regulations are neither contrary to the INA, nor
offensive to the due process clause. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 245 (3d Cir. 2003) (en
banc).
When the BIA employs its streamlining procedures, “we review the IJ’s opinion
and scrutinize its reasoning.” Id. Our review is limited to determining whether there is
substantial evidence to support the IJ’s decision. Id. at 247. This requires that we
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The IJ appropriately had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2001). The BIA
had appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b) (2002). We exercise appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to § 242(b) of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b).
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determine whether a reasonable fact finder could make the same determination as the
agency based on the administrative record. If so, there is substantial evidence to support
the finding. Id. at 249.
In Dia, we reitereated that the substantial evidence standard also applies to
adverse credibility determinations. Id.; Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir.
2002). The focus is on whether the IJ’s adverse finding “is supported by evidence that a
reasonable mind would find adequate” to support that determination. Dia, 353 F.3d at
249. Specific reasons should be given for finding a witness not credible, id., and those
“reasons must bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.” Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d
157, 162 (3d Cir. 1998).
After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that there is ample support for
the IJ’s adverse credibility determination and denial of Senthuran’s application for
asylum, for withholding of removal and for relief under the CAT. The IJ ’s analysis was
thorough and well reasoned. We will affirm.

4

